An Uncommon Democracy

Normally, or in common democracies, the popular parties hold power for as long as they are held popular in the eyes of the voters. and should that very party lose popularity, it contributes and benefits opposition parties and eventually results in the ruling party's fall from power. The exception to this however are countries with uncommon democracies, Japan being one of them.

According to Ethan Scheiner, one party dominance is not a troubling aspect of politics, because naturally people will want one party to rule for as long as they are supportive of its policies. However, what becomes troubling is when a single party consistently dominates the political scene regardless of how popular it is with the voters. Therefore, in some ways it is called an uncommon democracy because of the fact that democracy in this case is not functioning as it should with regards to politicians or parties holding power based on popularity. This suggests a fundamental malfunction in the democratic process.

Unlike other countries that have had uncommon democracies, Japan is experiencing a failure of party competition wherein despite the unpopularity of the ruling party, no opposition parties have been able to step up to the plate and take a successful swing at the ruling party. In Ethan Scheiner's talk on uncommon democracies he illustrates some pretty surprising figures just to emphasize how unpopular the LDP is despite its ruling status. 55% or more than half of the public have no political affiliation - maybe due to political apathy, 44% or almost half of the public dislike the public, and a minuscule 20-30% of the public sincerely support the LDP. bottom line is, the LDP has still been able to hold power despite very low approval ratings.

This brings us to the question why? why has there been a failure of party competition despite the unpopularity of the ruling party? why has Japan failed where other countries with similar uncommon democracies have succeeded in replacing the ruling party? The underlying reason for this failure is highly related to the success rates of opposition candidates, more specifically in the sub national level - local government. Ethan Scheiner illustrates his theory using the following diagram as the reason behind the failure of candidates on the sub national level:

Clientelism
+
Financial Centralization
I
I
Failure of opposition parties who do not belong to the national government
at sub national office elections

Before explaining how all these ideas are interrelated, it is important to understand the definitions of some of these terms. Clientelism is defined from a political perspective as a social organization characterized by a "patron-client" relationship wherein the powerful and rich patron - politician - promises things such as jobs, infrastructure, reforms, protection etc. in exchange for loyalty from the client - voter - in terms of votes or support. And fiscal centralization is the consolidation of all decision making powers pertaining to finance and the consolidation of financial assets under once central control, in this case the national government.

Another important factor to be discussed before tying up all these concepts is the "quality" of the candidate. The success of a candidate is highly dependent on the quality of the candidate in question, and quality here is defined as experience - that is political experience, like holding a position in the sub national level. A key reason for the failure of opposition parties against the LDP is the fact that the LDP has more "quality" candidates running, whereas candidates for the opposition parties are rather weak and inexperienced.

So how does everything come together? Ok, so an experienced candidate will mostly likely have ties or connections to politicians in the national level, this is common trait between the "quality" candidates of both the LDP and opposition parties. The difference here is that LDP candidates can make promises to voters using the LDP's fiscal centralization, and that is their trump card. This is where clientelism emerges, in the sense that the candidate will play the role of the "patron" who if elected will have access to the financial power under the control of the LDP and then be able to sponsor projects that will benefit the locals. candidates use this as a threat in some way making voters or the clients and sponsors think that if they do not provide their full support they may find themselves lacking in terms of finance, so voters in most cases will feel inclined to vote this particular candidate into power. This factor is multiplied in rural areas that are in need of development. The LDP has been consistently successful in terms of candidacy for offices governing rural areas simply because these areas are in dire need of development that can be successfully funded through the LDP's control of government finances.

The bottom line is, no matter how you look at, the LDP's influence especially in terms of financial benefits and its control over to whom or where it is doled out is extremely strong. This factor along with the fact that the LDP has more incumbents or experienced candidates running for different sub national offices heavily determines the outcomes of office elections on the national level.

As hopeless as it seems for Japan to reform its electoral system, Ethan Scheiner offers a small ray of hope in terms of some of his recommendation for possible ways for the opposition to topple the LDP once and for all. One would be an occurrence of a defection from the LDP of some of its key players which would destabilize it. Another important factor success would be the financial decentralization, which would remove the LDP's hold over government finances. And lastly, the opposition should take advantage over the growing anti-clientistic sentiments.